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Abstract
After the 1990 unification, East Germany’s capital income share plunged to 15.2
percent in 1991, then increased to 37.4 percent by 2015. To account for these large
changes in the capital share, I model an economy that gains access to a higher pro-
ductivity technology embodied in new plants. As existing low productivity plants
decrease production, the capital share varies due to the non-convex production tech-
nology: plants require a minimum amount of labor to produce output. Two policies—
transfers and government-mandated wage increases—have opposite effects on output
growth, but contribute to lowering the capital share early in the transition.
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1 Introduction
The stability of the capital and labor income shares over time and across countries is well
documented (e.g., Kaldor (1961), Gollin (2002)), and disciplined the choice of aggregate
production function in macroeconomic models (e.g., Cooley and Prescott (1995)). This
paper documents a dramatic departure from the constancy of factor income shares in East
Germany following the 1990 unification with West Germany. The capital share in East
Germany was 15.2 percent in 1991, doubled to 30.5 percent in 1995, and settled around
37 percent in the early 2000s (Figure 1).1 While data prior to unification is incomplete,
available information suggests the capital share was high in 1989 in East Germany.2
Figure 1: EAST GERMANY’S CAPITAL INCOME SHARE
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NOTES: Data for East Germany cover five Bundesla¨nder: Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Sach-
sen, Sachsen-Anhalt and Thu¨ringen. The capital income share is defined as is standard in the literature (see
equation 1 in Section 2). The data used to construct the capital share are from VGRdL (see Appendix A.1).
What accounts for East Germany’s low capital income share following unification? To
answer this question, I build a dynamic general equilibrium model in which an economy
transitions from a low to high productivity technology embodied in plants. This experi-
ment is motivated by the opening up of East Germany, which allowed replacing outdated
capital with more productive technologies.3 I incorporate two policies that set East Ger-
many apart from other transition economies: large transfers from West Germany and
1Section 2 provides details on the computation of the capital income share in East Germany since 1991.
2Two components of GDP suggest the (gross) capital share was high in East Germany in 1989. First, the
compensation of employees to GDP ratio was about 40 percent in East Germany in 1989, as documented by
Sinn and Sinn (1992, pp. 209-216). Second, East Germany’s consumption of fixed capital—one component
of gross capital income—was 15 percent of GDP in 1988, as reported by United Nations (1988, Table 1.3,p.
611). This value is close to the average depreciation to GDP ratio for East Germany during the 1980s.
3For example, Sinn and Sinn (1992, p. 44) argue that East Germany’s capital stock was “fairly obsolete”
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dramatic wage increases. While technology change delivers time-variation in the capital
share, the policies are mainly responsible for the low capital share early in the transition.
In the model, plants require a minimum amount of labor to produce output, as in
Hansen and Prescott (2005). Thus, plants may be operated or left idle at any time. Above
the minimum scale, plants operate a decreasing returns technology. Building new plants
requires one unit of capital investment. New plants are built only if the expected dis-
counted value of profits equals the cost of one unit of capital. Since the cost of new capital
is not plant specific and since high productivity plants have higher profits, their stock ac-
cumulates over the transition, while no investments are made in low productivity plants.
The model’s capital share varies endogenously due to declining profit shares at low
productivity plants. The key feature driving this result is the non-convexity in the plant
production technology. When plants employ more than the minimum required labor,
plant labor productivity is proportional to the wage, and profits are a constant share of
output. However, when the minimum labor constraint binds, a plant’s marginal product
of labor is lower than the wage, and the profit share is low. During the transition, low pro-
ductivity plants have declining profit shares, since they mostly operate at the minimum
scale where labor productivity is fixed, but wages grow during the transition.4 High pro-
ductivity plants have a constant profit share, as they always operate above the minimum
scale. As low productivity plants are left idle or exit, the economy’s capital share— com-
puted as a weighted average of plant profit shares—displays U-shaped dynamics. In the
new steady state, only high productivity plants operate and the capital share is constant.
Two government policies are incorporated in the model, to mirror East Germany’s ex-
perience. To capture the extensive financial support received from West Germany, I model
transfers from abroad that allow the economy’s total use of resources to expand beyond
domestic production. These transfers are available for either consumption or investment,
consistent with the data. To capture the dramatic wage increases in the early years of the
East German transition, I model union markups, whose magnitude is mandated by the
government.5 The data on transfers and wage increases are presented in Section 2. Both
transfers and union markups raise the cost of labor, reduce the profit share of low produc-
and “meant for methods of production that have little in common with the kind of specialization required
for an internationally competitive economy”.
4In the calibrated model, low productivity plants operate at the minimum scale by period three.
5Burda and Hunt (2001) argue that unions were able to choose wages in East Germany early in the
transition. Akerlof et al. (1991) argue that the West German government supported the wage increases
since it thought this would prevent migration to the West and the ensuing reduction in Western wages.
Sinn (2007) documents that the head of the Treuhandanstalt—the Trust set up to privatize the East German
companies—was told, by the federal government, to stay away from wage bargaining. He argues the
German government bears responsibility for allowing the wage increases.
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tivity plants, and contribute to lowering the capital share further during the transition.6
To evaluate the model’s success in delivering a decline in the capital share, I examine
an experiment in which the transfers and wage markups are exogenous time-varying in-
puts calibrated to the size of financial transfers and wage increases in East Germany. In
the initial period (which corresponds to 1989), the model’s capital share equals the cali-
brated steady state value of 0.365. In the third period (1991), the capital share declines to
0.256, and then rises throughout the transition. I perform counterfactual experiments to
decompose the relative importance of technology change and government policies in de-
livering the 11 percentage point drop in the capital share. Technology change in conjunc-
tion with the non-convexity of the plant production technology generates small variations
(of up to 5 percentage points) in the capital share throughout the transition. However, the
timing is inconsistent with data, since the capital share in 1991 remains at 0.365 in this
experiment. As a result, the large transfers and wage increases account for all of the 11
percentage point decline in the capital share. Transfers alone deliver a capital share of
0.35 in 1991, while wage markups alone yield a capital share of 0.318. Together, the two
policies interact nonlinearly and amplify their effects on the capital share.
The model’s predictions for output and expenditure shares line up reasonably well
with East German data. Output declines in the first two years of the model—by one third
of the drop in the data—due to a large decline in labor supply, which is consistent with
data. Thereafter, the model closely tracks East Germany’s output growth from 1991 to
2015. The two government policies have offsetting effects on output growth. Transfers
have a positive impact on growth, as they allow for more investment in the high produc-
tivity capital.7 Wage increases depress output growth by deterring capital accumulation
(as suggested, for example, in Akerlof et al. (1991) and Sinn (2007)) and by depressing la-
bor supply. Lastly, the model’s predictions for expenditure shares of output closely track
East German data. The model’s mean consumption to output ratio is 1.01, consistent with
data, an outcome made possible through the large transfers.
The 1990 German unification saw large migration flows from East to West Germany.
In this paper, I model East Germany as an economy that receives transfers from abroad
and sees large wage increases, but I abstract from migration flows (see Hunt (2006), Uhlig
(2006) or Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and Izem (2012) for facts on migration, and Raffelhu¨schen
(1992) for very early estimates on migration). To gauge the quantitative importance of
the closed economy assumption, I incorporate exogenously shrinking population in the
6Sinn (2007, pp. 162-163) argues the dramatic increase in East German wages altered investment
prospects and kept investors away. He documents that only 9 percent of the privatized East German com-
panies were sold to foreign investors, and attributes this to expectations of low profits due to high wages.
7Fischer, Sahay, and Ve´gh (1996) also show that foreign aid is conducive to higher GDP growth.
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model. While population changes give an incomplete view of the impact of migration—
since they do not capture changes in the age composition and skill of the non-immigrant
population—I find that the large declines in East Germany’s population only contribute
an additional 0.5 percentage points to the initial decline in the capital share. For this
reason, I leave more detailed explorations of migration and its quantitative impact on the
capital share to future research.
A recent literature has documented a substantial and prolonged decline in the labor
share in the United States of 5 to 6 percentage points (Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014),
vom Lehn (2018)). In contrast, the East German experience features sharp changes in the
capital share—an initial decline and subsequent spike—that are about 3 times larger. Sim-
ilar to Grossman et al. (2017), this paper explores the implications that productivity has
on the capital share. I show that while technology change alone delivers relatively small
variations in the capital share (of about 5 percentage points), policies such as transfers
and government-mandated wage increases can significantly amplify the effects.
This paper also contributes to the literature on transition economies, by showing that a
significant part of the initial decline in output observed in East Germany was due to gov-
ernment policies that led to a large fall in labor supply. Existing work has explored com-
mon factors that account for the sharp declines in output in transition economies in the
early 1990s.8 However, it is well documented that East Germany experienced the largest
downturn in output and decline in labor supply among Eastern European Economies.9,10
The quantitative analysis in this paper shows that the government policies implemented
in East Germany’s transition reduced labor supply and led to a sizable decline in output.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents facts about the
East German transition. Section 3 develops the theoretical framework. Section 4 presents
the quantitative results and the extension with population changes. Section 5 examines
the nonlinear impact of government policies on the capital share, Section 6 performs sen-
sitivity analysis and Section 7 concludes.
8Declines in output for a number of transition economies are documented, for example, in Blanchard
and Kremer (1997) and Roland and Verdier (1999). For a survey of the literature on the various explanation
for these initial output declines, see Campos and Coricelli (2002). Some quantitatively important factors are
costs associated with the adoption of new technologies of production (as in Atkeson and Kehoe (1993)) or
collapses in trade (Rodrik (1994) and Gorodnichenko, Mendoza, and Tesar (2012)).
9Dornbusch and Wolf (1994, Table 5.3) compare changes in gross domestic product for East Germany,
Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland from 1989− 1991 to emphasize the severity of East Germany’s initial
downturn. Also see Sinn and Sinn (1992, pp. 29-31). I reach the same conclusion when comparing gross
domestic product per working-age person across a number of Eastern European economies (Appendix A.1).
10Blanchard, Commander, and Coricelli (1995) document changes in employment for a number of
economies, while Dornbusch and Wolf (1994) report it for East Germany. I compute hours worked per
working-age person for East Germany and a number of other transition economies (see Appendix A.1 for
data sources). I find the decline in hours was largest in East Germany.
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2 Facts about the East German Transition
Of the many economies that underwent economic restructuring since the early 1990s,
East Germany stands out due to two government policies: the large transfers received
from West Germany, and the dramatic increases in wages negotiated by the West German
unions with the support of the German government (see, for example, Sinn (2002)).
Net transfers to East Germany in 1991 were 53.7 percent of East German GDP (Uhlig
(2008, Figure 2)).11 Despite their decline over time, net transfers still amounted to 32 per-
cent of East German GDP in 2003. While some transfers were used to subsidize invest-
ment, a large portion were channeled to consumption through social benefit programs
(see, for example, Jensen (2004)). As a result, East Germany’s consumption to output
ratio averaged 1.01 over 1991− 2015.
The increases in wages in East Germany were equally dramatic. Real hourly wages
increased by about 12.5 percent from 1989−1990 and by about 32 percent from 1990−1991
(Table 1). The high wage increases were made possible through the intervention of West
German unions with the government’s support. One of the reasons for raising wages was
the fear that East Germany would become an attractive location for foreign investors, due
to low wage costs, and would provide unwanted competition for firms in West Germany
(see, for example, Sinn (2007) and Burda and Funke (2001)).12
Table 1: EAST GERMANY’S ANNUAL HOURLY WAGE GROWTH (IN PERCENT)
1989− 1990 1990− 1991 1991− 1995 1995− 2005 2005− 2015
12.5 32.3 5.7 1.7 1.7
NOTES: Data for 1989−1990 is from Krueger and Pischke (1995) and, although it measures nominal monthly
wage growth, it reflects real growth due to a stable average consumer price index (CPI). Specifically, Akerlof
et al. (1991) report that average CPI in East Germany was almost unchanged through the end of 1990. Since
data for 1989 − 1990 is not hourly, it likely represents an underestimate of the true hourly wage growth,
because hours worked declined during that period. Data for 1990 − 1991 is real hourly wage growth from
Hunt (2001). Hourly wage growth rates for 1991−2015 are real and deflated using the consumption deflator
from national accounts (see Appendix A.1 for more details). Data over specific intervals of years (e.g.,
1991− 1995, 1995− 2005, 2005− 2015) represent averages of annual growth rates in hourly wages.
11Transfers are transactions in which an entity receives goods, services or cash payments from another
entity without providing anything in return. Net transfers are the difference between transfers received
from the rest of the world and transfers paid to the rest of the world.
12Other reasons for the wage increases are discussed in Akerlof et al. (1991). For details on the wage
bargaining process and the rapid increase in wages in East Germany see Krueger and Pischke (1995), Burda
and Hunt (2001), Burda and Funke (2001), Dornbusch and Wolf (1994) and Sinn (2007, pp. 161-163). The last
two sources also discuss the replacement of the East German mark with the Deutschmark. They argue that
the one-to-one currency conversion was not the main mistake made by the German government, but the
wage increases that came after this conversion were more problematic. Particularly, without the ensuing
wage increases, the currency conversion would have left East German wages relatively low.
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Is spite of the large transfers, East Germany did not experience the growth miracle
many had hoped for.13 After a two-year contraction that shrunk the economy to about
two-thirds of its 1989 level, output per working-age (15 − 64) person in East Germany
grew rapidly from 1991−1995, at an average yearly growth of 9.9 percent, before abruptly
slowing to 2.3 percent over 1995 − 2015. While East Germany’s rapid growth stood out
over 1991− 1995, other transition economies that did not receive extensive financial sup-
port fared better in terms of per capita GDP growth in the last two decades.14 In hindsight,
this outcome is not surprising. Canova and Ravn (2000) argue the weak growth was due
to transfers. Burda (2006) and Snower and Merkl (2006) argue that East Germany’s per-
formance was crippled by the transfers received and the large negotiated wage increases.
The wage increases likely depressed output growth by deterring capital accumulation
(see, for example, Akerlof et al. (1991) and Sinn (2007)).
Similar to the growth experience, the behaviour of East Germany’s capital income
share seems puzzling at first. As documented in Figure 1, the capital share doubled from
15.2 to 30.5 percent over 1991−1995 and stabilized around 37 percent since the early 2000s.
Following Kravis (1959) and Gollin (2002), the capital income share is defined as:
1− Compensation of Employees + Labor Income of Self-Employed
Gross Domestic Product - Indirect Taxes
(1)
In equation 1, the labor income of the self-employed is imputed as in Gollin (2002, p. 468),
assuming that a self-employed person earns the average employees’ compensation (Ap-
pendix A.1). The dramatic increase in East Germany’s capital share (Figure 1) is driven
by a 36 percent decrease in the compensation of employees to GDP ratio from 1991−2015.
The labor income of self-employed and indirect taxes have a relatively small impact on
the overall increase in the capital share since 1991.
Section 3 develops a model of an economy which transitions from a low to high pro-
ductivity technology embodied in plants. I show that the two government policies—the
large transfers and dramatic wage increases—were main drivers of the decline in East
Germany’s capital share early in the transition.
13Hoffmann (1992) documents the differing outlooks that prevailed early in the transition. Some be-
lieved that East Germany would grow fast, while others feared it would develop into a depressed region.
14Poland and Slovakia grew by more than East Germany since 1995 (see Appendix A.1 for data sources).
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3 Model Environment
The economy is populated by a large number of infinitely lived consumers who derive
utility from a final good and leisure. Consumers are heterogenous in the type of labor they
supply to the market, and are organized in a continuum of unions, based on their labor
type. Unions set the wage and face a downward sloping demand for their labor. The final
good is produced by high and low productivity plants, which may operate concurrently.
The government sets tax rates and limits the maximum markups that unions may charge.
3.1 Production Technology
Aggregate output is produced by plants using capital and a composite of differentiated
types of labor. There are two types of plants distinguished by their productivity level,
which can be low (L) or high (H). Plants with productivity zi ∈ {zL, zH} are referred to as
zi-plants, where zL < zH . The output of a zi-plant at time t is modelled as in Hansen and
Prescott (2005) through a decreasing returns technology above a minimum scale:
yi,t =
{
zin
1−θ
i,t if ni,t ≥ n¯
0 otherwise
(2)
Here, θ ∈ (0, 1), and ni,t is the quantity of composite labor input employed by a zi-plant
at t.15 There is a minimum requirement of (composite) labor necessary to operate a plant,
which is identical across plant types and is given by n¯. Each plant uses one unit of capital
which has “one-hoss-shay” depreciation. The capital operates at its full efficiency until
the plant exits the economy, with probability δi.
The decreasing returns technology guarantees that it is optimal to operate many small
plants rather than one large plant. Moreover, all operating plants of the same type will
employ the same amount of labor. The requirement that ni,t ≥ n¯ together with a limited
number of potential workers implies an upper bound on the number of plants that can be
operated. Labor can be moved across locations at no cost, hence it will only be allocated
to plants with ni,t ≥ n¯. As a result, at any time some plants may be left idle.
New plants are built only if the expected discounted value of profits equals the cost
of one unit of capital investment.16 Since the cost of capital investments is not plant spe-
15The plant labor input, ni,t, for i ∈ {L,H} is a composite of differentiated types of labor, li,t (j), j ∈ [0, 1].
Here, li,t (j) is the labor of type j hired by zi-plants at time t. The choice of li,t (j) for a given choice of
composite labor input, ni,t is described in footnote 18.
16Formally, at any time period s, investing 1 unit of capital gives expected discounted profits of∑∞
t=s+1 β
t−s U ′(Ct)
U ′(Cs)
· (1− τM )pii,t · [1− (1− τM ) δi]t−s−1. Here, profits for zi-plants at time t are denoted
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cific, and since high productivity plants have higher profits, new capital investments are
made only in high productivity plants. As a result, during a transition the stock of high
productivity plants accumulates, while there is no investment in low productivity plants.
Let Mi,t denote the stock of zi-plants that can potentially operate at time t and Nt the
aggregate labor to be employed at t.17 The aggregate production function is defined in
(3), where mi,t is the mass of zi-plants operated at t and allocated ni,t units of labor input.
F (Nt,MH,t,ML,t) ≡ max{mi,t,ni,t}i∈{H,L}
mH,tzHn
1−θ
H,t +mL,tzLn
1−θ
L,t (3)
s.t. mH,tnH,t +mL,tnL,t ≤ Nt
0 ≤ mi,t ≤Mi,t, for all i
ni,t ≥ n¯, for all i
Finding the maximum output that can be produced at t involves solving a static opti-
mization problem to allocate the aggregate labor input, Nt, across the available plants. If
there are enough high productivity plants to employ all the labor supplied, it is optimal to
leave all low productivity plants idle. If there is a scarcity of zH-plants, some or all of the
zL-plants are operated. It is clear that the market clearing condition for aggregate labor in
problem (3) holds with equality. The other inequality constraints bind or not, indicating
the mass of plants that operate and the amount of labor input assigned to each plant.
Proposition 1 Let α ≡ [(1− θ) zH/zL]1/θ and ρ ≡ (zH/zL)1/θ . The aggregate production func-
tion is the solution to the maximization problem in (3) and is given by:
F (Nt,MH,t,ML,t) =

zL (ρMH,t +ML,t)
θN1−θt if Nt ≥ η1,t
zHM
θ
H,t (Nt −ML,tn¯)1−θ + zLn¯1−θML,t if η2,t ≤ Nt ≤ η1,t
AMH,t + zLn¯
−θNt if η3,t ≤ Nt ≤ η2,t
zHM
θ
H,tN
1−θ
t if η4,t ≤ Nt ≤ η3,t
zH n¯
−θNt if Nt ≤ η4,t
(4)
where η1,t ≡ (ρMH,t +ML,t) n¯, η2,t ≡ (GαMH,t +ML,t) n¯, η3,t ≡ GαMH,tn¯, η4,t ≡MH,tn¯
and where Gα ≡ max {1, α} and A =
[
zH (Gα)
1−θ − zLGα
]
n¯1−θ.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.1.
by pii,t and are taxed at rate τM (allowing for depreciation) and δi is the probability a zi-plant exits (due
to capital depreciation). Since households own the plants, profits at any period t are discounted using the
households’ marginal utility of consumption relative to period s when the investment occurred.
17Equipment is a small fraction (about 15 percent) of the total capital stock in both East and West Ger-
many. Equipment is not modelled explicitly, but rather it is considered tied to the structures (i.e., plants).
8
Since the plant production function has decreasing returns to scale above n¯, plants
have an optimal size (equation 2). If the stock of high productivity plants is not high
enough to employ all the labor, then some or all of the low productivity plants operate.
In the first branch of the aggregate production function in equation (4), when Nt ≥ η1,t ≡
(ρMH,t +ML,t) n¯, all plants of both types operate and are allocated more than n¯ units of
labor (see plant labor choices in Appendix A.2.2). For lower Nt, a higher fraction of total
labor can be employed at high productivity plants and low productivity plants decrease
their scale. First, low productivity plants hire n¯workers (second branch of the production
function). Then, some low productivity plants stop operating. In this case, low produc-
tivity plants are not a scarce input and they earn no rent (third branch of the production
function). Finally, no low productivity plants operate, all labor is hired at high produc-
tivity plants and the aggregate production function is Cobb-Douglas. If Nt < MH,tn¯, only
some high productivity plants operate and the rest are idle. This situation does not occur
in equilibrium (Section 3.4) and is reflected in the model’s parameterization (Section 4.1).
Remark 2 The aggregate production function, F : R3 → R is: (i) continuous, (ii) homogeneous
of degree one, (iii) weakly increasing (iv) differentiable everywhere except at N = η1 = MH n¯,
and (v) weakly concave.
The aggregate labor input is a composite of differentiated types of labor, lt (j), j ∈
[0, 1] . Then, Nt =
[∫
lt (j)
ν dj
]1/ν , where 1/ (1− ν) is the elasticity of substitution between
the differentiated types of labor.
There is a representative firm in the economy that operates the plants. The problem of
the representative firm can be stated in two parts. First, given factor prices: rH,t, rL,t and
wt, the firm chooses Nt,MH,t, and ML,t to maximize profits:
max
{Yt,Nt,MH,t,ML,t}
{Yt − wtNt − rH,tMH,t − rL,tML,t}
s.t. Yt = F (Nt,MH,t,ML,t)
Second, for any given amount of aggregate labor, Nt, the aggregate demand for each
differentiated type of labor, lt (j) , is the solution to:
wtNt = min{lt(j)},j∈[0,1]
∫
wt (j) lt (j) dj (5)
s.t. Nt ≥
[∫
lt (j)
ν dj
]1/ν
where wt (j) is the wage for labor of type j. I set ν ≤ 1 so the problem in (5) has a solution.
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The demand for type j labor is:
lt (j) =
(
wt
wt (j)
)1/(1−ν)
Nt (6)
where wt =
[∫
wt (j)
ν(ν−1) dj
](ν−1)/ν
is the aggregate wage.18
3.2 Consumers
Consumers are endowed with a specific type of labor and are organized in a continuum
of unions indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. Each union represents consumers with a specific type of
labor. Unions are modeled in the spirit of Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987). Unions set the
wage for labor of type j and face a downward sloping demand for labor given by (6).
The preferences of a representative consumer in the jth union are given by:
∞∑
t=0
βtU [Ct (j) , lt (j)] (7)
The jth union chooses consumption C (j), non-negative investments in new plants
XH (j) and XL (j), rents capital stocks MH (j) and ML (j), and chooses the wage rate w (j)
to maximize (7) subject to the demand for labor given in (6), the budget constraint in (8)
and the laws of motion for capital in (9) and (10).
(1 + τC)Ct (j) +XH,t (j) +XL,t (j) ≤ (1− τN)wt (j) lt (j) (8)
+ (1− τM) [rH,tMH,t (j) + rL,tML,t (j)]
+τM [δHMH,t (j) + δLML,t (j)] + Tt
MH,t+1 (j) = (1− δH)MH,t (j) +XH,t (j) (9)
ML,t+1 (j) = (1− δL)ML,t (j) +XL,t (j) (10)
Here, rental rates of capital are rH,t and rL,t, and depreciation rates are δH and δL. Taxes on
consumption, labor and capital income are τC , τN , τM , respectively. Lump-sum transfers
are Tt. The union takes rental rates, tax rates and the aggregate wage, wt as given.
The cost of creating new plants (i.e., the cost of one unit of capital investment) is the
same for high and low productivity plants, as seen in equation (8). New plants are built
18Similarly, given the composite labor input, ni,t, hired at date t by a zi-plant, one can derive the demand
for each differentiated type of plant labor input li,t (j) ,where i ∈ {L,H} and j ∈ [0, 1]. The following holds:
li,t (j) = (wt/wt (j))
1/(1−ν)
ni,t. Using equation (6), we find li,t (j) = (ni,t/Nt) · lt (j) for all i and j.
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only if the expected discounted value of plant profits equals the cost of one unit of capital.
Thus, in equilibrium, only high productivity plants are built, as discussed in Section 3.1.
3.3 Government
The government runs a balanced budget every period. It taxes consumption, labor in-
come and capital income. It permits depreciation allowances as given by τMδHMH,t (j) +
τMδLML,t (j) for every j. Transfers from the rest of the world, Trt, are an additional source
of government revenues. The revenues collected by the government are lump-sum re-
bated to the households and denoted by Tt.
Tt =
∫
[τCCt (j) + τNwt (j) lt (j)] dj (11)
+
∫
[τM (rH,t − δH)MH,t (j) + τM (rL,t − δL)ML,t (j)] dj + Trt
In addition, the government restricts the monopoly power of unions and the wage
markups charged. This policy is modeled as a provision to make unions set wages com-
petitively if markups exceed 1/ν¯t, where ν¯t ≥ ν. As a result, the markup charged is 1/ν¯t.
This policy is meant to capture the government’s support for the large wage increases
negotiated by the West German unions in East Germany (see Section 2 for details).
3.4 Equilibrium
In this section, I define an equilibrium and discuss key properties of the transition from a
low to high productivity technology and the new steady state.
Definition 3 An equilibrium are allocations
{
Yt, Nt,MH,t,ML,t,
{
ldt (j)
}
j∈[0,1]
}∞
t=0
and
{
{Ct (j) , lst (j) , XH,t (j) , XL,t (j) ,MH,t (j) ,ML,t (j)}j∈[0,1]
}∞
t=0
and
prices
{
rH,t, rL,t, wt, {wt (j)}j∈[0,1]
}∞
t=0
such that:
1. Given parameters
{
τC,t, τN,t, τM,t, T rt, ν¯t
}∞
t=0
, initial conditionsML,0, MH,0 and prices
{rH,t, rL,t, wt}∞t=0, the allocation {Ct (j) , lst (j) , XH,t (j) , XL,t (j) ,MH,t (j)ML,t (j)}∞t=0,
and {wt (j)}∞t=0 solve the jth union’s problem for every j ∈ [0, 1] .
2. Given prices,
{
Yt, Nt,MH,t,ML,t,
{
ldt (j)
}
j∈[0,1]
}∞
t=0
solves the firm’s problem.
3. The government balances its budget given in equation (11) for all t.
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4. The markets clear and the resource constraint holds for all t.
ldt (j) = l
s
t (j) = lt (j) for all j∫
Mi,t (j) dj = Mi,t for all i ∈ {L,H}∫
[Ct (j) +XH,t (j) +XL,t (j)] dj ≤ Yt + Trt
A transition occurs because the economy gains access to a higher productivity technol-
ogy embodied in new plants. This experiment is motivated by the 1990 unification which
provided East Germany access to the world technology frontier. Initially, at t = 0, the
economy has only zL-plants and the stock of new plants is zero, i.e., MH,0 = 0. However,
the high productivity technology becomes available and there are positive investments
into it, i.e., XH,0 > 0. Due to the availability of more productive zH-plants, investments
in low productivity plants cease. This follows from the fact that building plants of either
type is equally costly (see equation (8)), but the zL-plants are less productive and so the
expected discounted value of their profits is lower (see discussion in footnote 16 of Sec-
tion 3.1).19 As a result, the stock of zL-plants depreciates over time at rate δL ≥ 0, while
the more productive zH-plants accumulate during the transition.
The first order conditions of the jth union problem are summarized by XL,t (j) = 0,
the budget constraint, the laws of motion for capital, as well as:
UC (Ct (j) , lt (j))
UC (Ct+1 (j) , lt+1 (j))
= β
1 + τC,t
1 + τC,t+1
(1 + (1− τM,t+1) (rH,t+1 − δH))
wt (j) = min
{
1
ν
,
1
ν¯t
}
· (1 + τC,t)
(1− τN,t)
−Ul [Ct (j) , lt (j)]
UC [Ct (j) , lt (j)]
(12)
lim
t→∞
βtUC [Ct (j) , lt (j)]MH,t+1 (j) = 0
where 1/ν is the wage markup that the union chooses, and 1/ν¯t is the markup allowed by
the government. The intratemporal condition (12) is derived in detail in Appendix A.2.4.
I assume ν ≤ ν¯t ≤ 1 for all t. The wage markup in equilibrium is thus 1/ν¯t, meaning
that the wage increases are mandated by the government. The markup is an exogenous
policy in numerical experiments, and the values for ν¯t are discussed in Section 4.1.
The first order conditions of the representative firm’s problem are:
ri,t =
∂F (Nt,MH,t,ML,t)
∂Mi,t
, i ∈ {L,H} , wt = ∂F (Nt,MH,t,ML,t)
∂Nt
19It is also easy to show using (4) that the marginal product of high productivity plants, MH,t, is strictly
higher than the marginal product of low productivity plants, ML,t, whenever all zH -plants operate.
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Given the symmetry of the unions, they all make the same choices. In particular,
wt (j) = wt and lt (j) = Nt. For the remainder of the paper, I drop the j subscripts.
Proposition 4 Along the transition path, as the stock of low productivity plants approaches zero
asymptotically, the aggregate production function in (4) becomes:
lim
ML,t→0
F (Nt,MH,t,ML,t) =
{
zHM
θ
H,tN
1−θ
t if Nt ≥MH,tn¯
zH n¯
−θNt if Nt ≤MH,tn¯
Proof. See Appendix A.2.3.
Proposition 5 In a steady state, there are no idle zH-plants. The aggregate production function
is Cobb-Douglas, F (Nt,MH,t,ML,t) = zHM θH,tN
1−θ
t , and n¯ ≤
[
zHθ(1−τM )
β−1−1+(1−τM )δH
]1/(θ−1)
.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that a steady state is reached at time T , and some zH-
plants are idle. It follows that it is impossible to allocate at least n¯ units of labor to all
zH-plants, i.e., NT < MH,T n¯. Using Proposition 4, the aggregate output is zH n¯−θNT . Since
zH-plants are not a scarce input in production, they earn no rents. There will be no invest-
ments undertaken: XH,T = 0. Thus, the capital stock depreciates: MH,T+1 < MH,T . This
contradicts the fact that a steady state was reached at time T . Hence, in a steady state all
zH-plants operate and N∗ ≥ M∗H n¯, where the asterisk (∗) denotes steady state. Using the
steady state Euler equation and the first order condition for the return to capital, it is easy
to show that having no idle zH-plants entails n¯ ≤
[
zHθ(1−τM )
β−1−1+(1−τM )δH
]1/(θ−1)
.
In numerical experiments, n¯ satisfies the parameter restriction in Proposition 5. Along
the transition path and in the new steady state, all zH-plants operate. There is no uncer-
tainty in the model and due to the trade-off between consumption and savings, it is not
optimal to accumulate too many zH-plants and then leave some idle.
4 Quantitative Analysis
I calibrate the model to the East German economy using national accounts and revenue
statistics. The benchmark model lines up well with East German data on output, expen-
diture shares, factor income shares, and hours worked. I perform counterfactual experi-
ments to illustrate that the model’s success in delivering a large initial drop in the capital
share is due to the government policies: the transfers and wage markups. The two poli-
cies have nonlinear effects, as their joint impact on reducing the capital share is almost
double the contributions of each policy. Lastly, I show that incorporating declining pop-
ulation has a quantitatively small impact on the capital share.
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4.1 Parameter Choices
Table 2 presents the benchmark model’s parameters and the data used in the calibration.
The time-varying inputs—the net transfers to East Germany and its wage markups—are
presented in Figure 2. Appendix A.1 provides detailed data sources.
Table 2: BENCHMARK MODEL PARAMETERS AND TIME-VARYING INPUTS
PARAMETERS VALUES TARGETS
Capital income share θ = 0.365 Average for Germany, 1991− 2015
Discount factor β = 0.96 Steady state capital stock of 2.7
Capital depreciation rates δH = δL = 0.08 Average for Germany, 1991− 2015
Tax rate on consumption τC = 0.16 Average for Germany, 1991− 2015
Tax rate on labor income τN = 0.41 Average for Germany, 1991− 2015
Tax rate on capital income τM = 0.24 Average for Germany, 1991− 2015
zH-type capital stock in 1989 MH,0 = 0 EG capital stock was obsolete, see
Sinn and Sinn (1992, p. 43-44)
zL-type capital stock in 1989
ML,0
Y0
= 3.5 EG capital to output ratio estimates
range from 1.6 to 4.9, see
Sinn and Sinn (1992, p. 43, 209)
Minimum labor requirement n¯ = 0.94 · N∗
M∗H
Sensitivity analysis
Leisure parameter ψ = 0.84 EG aggregate hours in 1989
Low productivity level zL = 1 Normalization
Ratio of plant productivities zH/zL = 1.65 EG TFP growth, 1991− 2015
TIME-VARYING INPUTS VALUES TARGETS
Transfers, Trt Figure 2 Net Transfers to EG
Wage markups, 1/νt Figure 2 EG hourly wage growth, 1989− 91
NOTES: EG denotes East Germany. Detailed data sources are provided in Appendix A.1.
The model’s steady state capital income share θ is set to 0.365, the average for unified
Germany over 1991 − 2015. The capital share is computed using equation 1. The large
variation in the capital share in East Germany has a small impact on the share for unified
Germany, because East Germany is small relative to the West (e.g., about 13 percent in
total GDP terms). Indeed, the capital shares of unified Germany and West Germany fluc-
tuate little and track each other closely, with Germany’s share about 0.7 percentage points
lower, on average. The discount factor targets a steady state capital to output ratio of 2.7.
The annual depreciation rate of the capital stocks is set to be the same for both stocks and
targets the average depreciation to GDP ratio for Germany.
Tax rates on consumption, labor and capital income are computed using the method-
ology of Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994). In the model, tax rates do not vary over time
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and are set to the averages for Germany over 1989− 2015.
Given the values of θ, β, δH , δL, τC , τN , τM , the remaining parameters from Table 2 are
determined jointly. We use data provided by Sinn and Sinn (1992) to set the capital stock
to output ratios.20 Consistent with the idea that East Germany’s capital at unification was
outdated (see footnote 3), the stock of high-productivity plants in 1989 is set to zero. The
stock of low-productivity plants is set to 3.5 times GDP, which is the midpoint of the Sinn
and Sinn (1992) estimates of the net stock of fixed assets (excluding land) of 1.6 and 4.9
GDPs in 1989. The high-end estimate is based on an exchange rate of 1 to 1 between the
Mark and Deutschmark, while the low-end estimate is obtained by writing-off 67 percent
of the capital stock to accommodate West German accounting rules. In the model, the
stock of low productivity plants becomes outdated once the new technology is available,
and it depreciates gradually, as there are no further investments into it. In Section 6, I
perform sensitivity analysis to the initial stock of low-productivity plants.
The utility function is U (C, l) = log (C) + ψ log (1− l), where ψ is chosen to match
aggregate hours worked in East Germany in 1989 (see Appendix A.1). The minimum
labor requirement n¯ generates a plant level non-convexity and influences which plants
operate in equilibrium. In the steady state, all zH-plants operate above the minimum
scale and n¯ ≤ N∗/M∗H =
[
zHθ(1−τM )
β−1−1+(1−τM )δH
]1/(θ−1)
(see Proposition 5). Along the transition
path, since there is no reason to accumulate too many zH-plants and leave some idle, it
also must be that n¯ ≤ Nt/MH,t for all t. I set n¯ = 0.94 ·N∗/M∗H to ensure these constraints
hold.21 This choice of n¯ results in low productivity plants operating at the minimum labor
constraint early in the transition. In Section 6, I perform sensitivity analysis to show that
for very low values of n¯, all zL-plants operate above the minimum scale for a longer period
during the transition (nL > n¯), which is inconsistent with evidence on plant closures in
East Germany after unification (e.g., see Bru¨cker (1995) or Kaser (2007)).
The productivity of the old production technology, zL, is normalized to 1. The pro-
ductivity of the new production technology, zH , is set to match the increase in total factor
productivity (TFP) over the period 1991 − 2015. Total factor productivity is calculated—
as is standard in the literature—as the Solow residual from a Cobb-Douglas production
function: TFPt ≡ Yt/
[
(MH,t +ML,t)
θN1−θt
]
, whereMH,t+ML,t represents the total capital
stock at time t. In calculating TFP growth in the data, we first detrend TFP by 1.012(1−θ),
where 1.2 percent represents the average annual growth rate in GDP per working-age
person in West Germany over 1991 − 2015. Since the model doesn’t feature exogenous
20See Appendix A in Sinn and Sinn (1992) on pages 214− 216 for data and discussion on pages 43− 44.
21During a transition, the stock of zH -plants overshoots its steady state level slightly, although these
plants operate above the minimum scale at all times. As a result, the ratio Nt/MH,t dips below its steady
state value during the transition. For this reason, n¯ is set strictly below the ratio N∗/M∗H .
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growth in technology, this transformation allows the model and data to be comparable.
Net transfers are an exogenous input into the model (Figure 2.a). Transfers are zero
in the first period, which corresponds to 1989. Net transfers from West to East Germany
for 1990 − 2003 are from Uhlig (2008, Figure 2) and are comparable to data reported by
the European Commission (2002). Since data for 2004− 2015 is not readily available, I use
the East German trade balance deficit to GDP ratio—a proxy for the costs of unification
suggested by IWH (2014)—to infer the rate of change in net transfers. This calculation
implies net transfers in 2015 are about 15 percent of East German GDP. After 2015, I let
transfers decline linearly to zero by 2020. This choice is motivated by the scheduled end
date of 2019 of the Solidarity Pact II, signed by the federal states and aimed at promoting
East Germany’s development. While this package is just part of the transfers received, I
assume all other transfers stop as well, and perform sensitivity analysis in Section 6.
Figure 2: MODEL INPUTS: TRANSFERS AND WAGE MARKUPS
1989 2003 2015 2025
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NOTES: Net transfers to East Germany for 1990 − 2003 are from Uhlig (2008). For 2004 − 2015, transfers
shrink at the annual growth rates of East Germany’s trade balance to GDP ratio. Thereafter, transfers decline
linearly to zero in 2020. Wage markups match East Germany’s wage increases between 1989 and 1991.
The government-mandated wage markups, 1/ν¯t, are chosen so that the model matches
the large increases in wages between 1989 and 1991 (see Table 1). In setting the values of
ν¯t, wages from East German data are detrended by the annual growth factor 1.012. I set
ν¯1989 = 1, ν¯1990 = 0.92 and ν¯1991 = 0.72. Thereafter, I keep markups unchanged (Figure
2.b). In Section 6, I perform sensitivity analysis by allowing the wage markups, 1/ν¯t, to
decline gradually over time after 1991.
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4.2 Numerical Experiments
I use the calibrated model to examine the East German transition. I perform counterfac-
tual experiments to decompose the relative importance of technology change and gov-
ernment policies to the decline in East Germany’s capital income share.
Figure 3 plots results from the benchmark experiment in which the transfers and wage
markups are exogenous time-varying inputs calibrated to the size of financial support
received and the large wage increases in East Germany. Total factor productivity and
hourly wages grow endogenously in the model during the transition from low to high
productivity technology. As discussed in Section 4.1, the model was calibrated to deliver
an increase in TFP of about 45 percent over 1991−2015, consistent with East German data
(Figure 3.a). The more productive plants accumulate gradually over time, so the model
does not deliver the sharp TFP increase observed between 1991 and 1995. The model’s
wage markups were calibrated to match the large increases in hourly wages between 1989
and 1991. The behavior of the wage rate following 1991 is determined endogenously, and
it matches the data well (Figure 3.b).
The model’s GDP closely tracks East Germany’s GDP per working-age person (Figure
3.c). The data is detrended to allow comparisons to the model which does not feature
exogenous growth in technology.22 I find the model’s output declines by 10 percent over
1989 − 1991, about one third of the decline observed in the data. This drop in output is
driven entirely by the decline in hours worked.23 The large increases in hourly wages
between 1989 and 1991 depress hours worked in the model. Moreover, the transfers re-
ceived generate a wealth effect which further reduces hours. After 1991, the model’s
output grows, albeit initially at a lower pace compared to East German data, because the
productivity improvements in the model occur gradually. The overall output growth in
the model over the period 1991− 2015 is similar to the data.
The model delivers time-variation in the capital income share (Figure 3.d). In the first
two years of the model, the capital share equals the calibrated value of θ = 0.365. After-
wards, the capital share declines since the accumulation of the more productive capital
pushes low productivity plants to reduce their scale. Due to the binding minimum scale
constraint, low productivity plants have a lower capital share since their labor productiv-
ity is fixed, while wages grow during the transition. Transfers and wage increases raise
the cost of labor and reduce the profits of the zL-plants. The model delivers an 11 percent-
22As detailed in Section 4.1, East German GDP is detrended with an annual trend growth factor of 1.012.
23Changes in capital stocks do not depress model output. While ML,t + MH,t decreases slightly ini-
tially, output in the initial two years of transition equals zL (ρMH,t +ML,t)
θ
N1−θt (see equation 4), and the
productivity-adjusted measure of capital, ρMH +ML, does not decline.
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Figure 3: EAST GERMANY: DATA AND BENCHMARK MODEL PREDICTIONS
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Legend:
NOTES: East Germany’s TFP, hourly wages and GDP per capita are detrended as described in Section 4.1.
age points drop in the capital share, from a value of 0.365 in 1990 to 0.256 in 1991. There-
after, the capital share increases as less output in the economy is produced by zL-plants.
The model predicts that by 2008 no low productivity plants are used for production, and
the aggregate capital share is back to 0.365. The stock ML is not completely depreciated
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by that time, but the remaining zL-plants are left idle and their marginal product is zero.24
Large transfers and wage increases contribute to a 29 percent decline in hours worked
over 1989−1991, in line with East German data (Figure 3.e). After 1991, the model predicts
a slight increase in hours due to the decline in transfers over time. In addition, the model’s
predictions for expenditure shares match the data well (Figure 3.f). Since unification, East
Germany’s consumption and investment exceeded production, as the consumption to
output ratio averaged 1.01 over 1991−2015, while the investment to output ratio averaged
0.32. This was made possible through the large transfers received. In the model, while
transfers are available for consumption and investment, most get allocated to consump-
tion, and only some go to investment, consistent with the data. The model delivers an av-
erage consumption share of output of 1.01 and an average investment share of 0.29 for the
period 1991 − 2015. The counterparts in a model with no transfers (i.e., Trt = 0 for all t)
are an average consumption-output ratio of 0.74 and investment-output ratio of 0.26.
I perform counterfactual experiments to decompose the contribution of government
policies to output growth and the capital share. First, I remove the government-mandated
wage increases from the model by setting ν¯t = 1 for all t. This experiment labeled ”Model
with transfers alone” in Figure 4, delivers a smaller decline in hours worked and output
early in the transition. Throughout the transition, hours are higher, the zH-plants accu-
mulate faster, and output grows by more compared to the benchmark experiment with
both transfers and wage markups (Figure 4.a). The drop in the capital share is smaller,
and its value is 0.35 in 1991 compared to 0.256 in the benchmark (Figure 4.b). In the ex-
periment with wage markups alone, Trt = 0 for all t, output is depressed compared to
the benchmark, while the capital share is 0.318 in 1991.
The non-convexity in the plant production technology is crucial for generating vari-
ations in the capital share. Without transfers or wage markups (i.e., Trt = 0 and ν¯t = 1
for all t), the capital income share varies little initially, and by at most 5 percentage points
throughout the transition, due to the change in technology. Introducing either of the two
government policies yields further declines in the capital share. Transfers alone deliver a
capital share of 0.35 in 1991, while wage markups alone yield to a capital share of 0.318 in
1991 (Figure 4.b). When the two policies are considered together, they have a nonlinear
effect on the capital share, which declines to 0.256 in 1991, as shown in the benchmark
experiment. Section 5 discusses these nonlinearities in more detail.
24In the benchmark, the gross marginal product of MH,t capital (denoted by FMH,t ) drops sharply from
41 to 21 percent in the first 3 periods, and then gradually reaches its steady state value of 13.5 percent. Gross
returns to ML,t (denoted by FML,t ) decline from 10 percent to zero. The mean return over the transition for
the two types of capital—computed as (FMH,t ·MH,t + FML,t ·ML,t)/(MH,t +ML,t)—is 12.6 percent.
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Figure 4: EAST GERMANY: DATA AND PREDICTIONS FROM DIFFERENT EXPERIMENTS
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NOTES: East Germany’s GDP per capita is detrended as described in Section 4.1.
4.2.1 An Extension with Population Changes
To evaluate the effects of a declining population in East Germany following unification,
I extend the model to incorporate population growth. While the decline in population
doesn’t capture some aspects of migration, such as the age composition or skill of the
migrants, it impacts the aggregate labor input, and contributes to further declines (albeit
small) in the capital income share, relative to the benchmark.
Incorporating population growth entails relatively simple changes to the consumer
problem. First, consumers’ utility becomes
∑∞
t=0 β
tU (Ct, lt) · Λt, where Λt denotes the
population at time t, and where I simplified the notation to reflect the symmetry of unions
(i.e., I dropped j subscripts). Second, the laws of motion for capital stocks become: Λt+1
Λt
·
Mi,t+1 = (1− δL)Mi,t +Xi,t, for i ∈ {L,H}.
The working-age (15 − 64) population in East Germany shrunk by 3.3 percent from
1989 − 1990, by 1.4 percent from 1990 − 1991, and by an average of 0.8 percent from
1991− 2016. I treat the yearly population growth rates from 1989− 2016 as an exogenous
model input. After 2016, I let population growth equal the average since 1991. I recalibrate
the model to match the same calibration targets as in Section 4.1 (only ψ is changed).
The quantitative impact of the declining population on the capital share is small. As
before, the capital share equals θ in the first two periods of the model. By the third period
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(which corresponds to 1991), the capital share declines to 0.25 in the model with popu-
lation change relative to the benchmark value of 0.256. In both experiments, the capital
share returns to θ = 0.365 by 2009. For the periods when it is lower than θ, the aggregate
capital share is on average 0.6 percentage points lower with declining population com-
pared to the benchmark with no change in population. While population change is an
imperfect proxy for migration, given the results of this section, I leave more detailed ex-
plorations of migration and its quantitative impact on the capital share to future research.
5 A Closer Look at the Model’s Factor Income Shares
In this section, I discuss the model’s success in generating time-varying factor shares.
I illustrate that the non-convexity in the plant-level production technology is crucial in
allowing for variation in factor shares. In the presence of the non-convexity, introducing
transfers and wage markups affects factor shares non-linearly, leading to declines in the
capital share that are of larger magnitude and that occur sooner in the transition.25
5.1 Technology Change and the Dynamics of Factor Income Shares
I illustrate the impact that technology change alone can have on the dynamics of factor
income shares. To this end, I examine an economy in which transfers are zero and wages
are perfectly competitive, i.e., Trt = 0 and ν¯t = 1 for all t. I relate the profit shares of
plants that operate during a transition from a low to a high productivity technology to
the aggregate capital share. I show that variation in the profit share for plants that operate
at the minimum scale translates in a time-varying aggregate capital share.
Let pii,t denote total profits of a zi-plant at time t, where i ∈ {H,L}. The profit share of
output is denoted by φi,t = pii,t/yi,t.
Proposition 6 The plant profit shares satisfy φi,t ≤ θ for all t, with equality if ni,t > n¯.
Proof. For each t, zi-plants maximize profits subject to hiring at least n¯ units of labor.
pii,t ≡ max
ni,t≥n¯
zin
1−θ
i,t − wtni,t
The first order condition is wt ≥ (1− θ) zin−θi,t , with equality if ni,t > n¯. Thus, profits
are given by pii,t ≤ zin1−θi,t −
[
(1− θ) zin−θi,t
]
ni,t = θzin
1−θ
i,t = θyi,t, with equality if ni,t > n¯.
Equivalently, φi,t ≡ pii,tyi,t ≤ θ, with equality if ni,t > n¯.
25Without the non-convex plant technology, the government policies have no effect on the capital share.
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If the minimum labor constraint does not bind, plant labor productivity is propor-
tional to the wage rate and the plant profit share is constant. However, if plants are
constrained to hire n¯ units of labor, the profit share is lower than θ.
During a transition, all high productivity plants operate and they hire more than the
minimum required labor. Hence, φH,t = θ for all t. Low productivity plants initially hire
more than n¯ units of labor, but later switch to operating at the minimum scale, as more
labor is hired at the zH-plants. Thus, φL,t ≤ θ with strict inequality for some t.
Let φt denote the aggregate capital income share at t. Then, φt = (ΠH,t + ΠL,t) /Yt,
where Πi,t are the total profits for plants of type zi at t and Yt is aggregate output at t.
Letting Yi,t be the total output produced by plants of type zi at t, the aggregate capital
income share can also be written as the weighted average of plant profit shares.
φt =
ΠH,t
YH,t
YH,t
Yt
+
ΠL,t
YL,t
YL,t
Yt
= φH,t
YH,t
Yt
+ φL,t
YL,t
Yt
The second equality is obtained using Πi,t/Yi,t = pii,tMi,t/yi,tMi,t = φi,t for all i and t.
Moreover, using the result φH,t = θ for all t, the aggregate capital income share becomes:
φt = θ − (θ − φL,t) YL,t
Yt
(13)
Equation (13) shows that if the profit share of zL-plants equals θ or the total output
produced by these plants is zero, the aggregate capital share is constant and equals θ.
However, if φL,t < θ and YL,t > 0, then φt < θ. Low productivity plants have a profit share
lower than θ whenever they hire only n¯ units of labor (Proposition 6). Hence, the non-
convexity in the plant-level technology is crucial for generating variation in factor shares.
The aggregate capital share is lower than θ if (i) all low productivity plants operate and
they hire n¯ labor, or if (ii) only some low productivity plants operate and hire n¯ labor.
In an economy that starts out with only zL-plants, and where the more productive
technology becomes available, a growing fraction of total labor is hired at these plants.
Low productivity plants reduce their scale, until they all hire only n¯ labor.26 One of two
scenarios can occur. If the productivity difference between the plants is large enough,
i.e., α ≡ [(1− θ) zH/zL]1/θ > 1, only a fraction of the low productivity plants continue to
operate and hire n¯ units of labor, while the rest are left idle.27 If the difference in plant
level productivities is smaller, i.e., α < 1, all zL-plants operate throughout the transition
26For low n¯, it is possible that all zL-plants operate above the minimum scale during the transition. This
outcome is in sharp contrast to the experience of transition economies and is not considered here.
27The condition α > 1 is equivalent to zH/zL > 1/ (1− θ). For θ = 0.365, α > 1 if the high productivity
technology is about 57 percent more productive than the low productivity technology.
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at the minimum scale and only exit the economy as they depreciate. The intuition is that
when α > 1, the high productivity capital stock accumulates faster during the transition
and these plants hire more labor compared to α < 1. Low productivity plants cannot
shrink their size below n¯ and, as a result, some of them become idle. Ultimately, in both
scenarios, only high productivity plants operate in the new steady state.
The dynamics of the aggregate capital income share are shown in Figure 5. The left
side panel plots the aggregate capital share in an economy with α > 1. Initially, all plants
operate and hire more than n¯ units of labor and the aggregate capital share equals θ. As
the stock of zH-plants accumulates over time, the low productivity plants reduce their
scale. First all zL-plants operate at n¯, then some of them stop operating. During this pro-
cess, the capital income share falls below θ. In periods when some zL-plants are idle, they
earn no rents because they are not a scarce input in production. The capital share increases
rapidly during these periods, as plants with low profit share exit. In the steady state of
the economy, the capital share is constant again and equal to θ. The U-shaped dynamics
for the aggregate capital share are slightly different when α < 1 (see the right side panel
of Figure 5). As discussed previously, when the productivity difference between the two
types of plants is smaller, so that α < 1, all zL-plants operate throughout the transition
and they exit the economy as they depreciate. The aggregate capital share drops below
θ, as low productivity plants operate at the corner. As the economy replaces these plants,
the capital share returns gradually to the value θ.
Figure 5: THE CAPITAL SHARE IN A MODEL WITH TECHNOLOGY CHANGE ONLY
  θ
All z
H
No z
L
All z
H
Some z
L
All z
H
All z
L
: n
All z
H
All z
L
time, t
 
 
α > 1
  θ
All z
H
All z
L
: n
All z
H
All z
L
time, t
 
 
α < 1
NOTES: The figure plots the dynamics of the capital income share in an economy where the aggregate
production function is given in equation 4, for different values of α ≡ [(1− θ) zH/zL]1/θ.
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5.2 Nonlinear Impact of Transfers and Wage Markups on Factor Shares
Section 5.1 showed that technology change combined with the non-convexity in the plant-
level production technology generates U-shaped dynamics of the aggregate capital in-
come share. Here, I show that introducing transfers or wage markups may lead to larger
declines in the capital share, earlier in the transition. Moreover, the two policies interact
non-linearly to amplify their impact on the capital share.
To illustrate these results, I perform a range of experiments in which there is a one-time
permanent change in either transfers or wage markups. First, I consider the calibrated
economy from Section 4, but I set wages perfectly competitively (i.e., ν¯t = 1 for all t), and
I let transfers increase from zero at t = 0 to Tr ∈ [0, 70] percent of output starting period
t = 1. I contrast these experiments to the economy with zero transfers and perfectly
competitive wages discussed in Section 5.1, to highlight the impact on the capital share.
The permanent increase in the flow of transfers at t = 1 has a positive income effect
which leads to a reduction in aggregate labor input and an increase in the wage rate
relative to a model with no transfers. If transfers are large enough, the drop in labor at
time t = 1 when the policy is introduced is associated with a decline in output. Thereafter,
a model with transfers generates higher output growth compared to a model with zero
transfers because transfers allow for a faster accumulation of high productivity capital.
The decline in the capital share may occur sooner in the transition and is of larger magni-
tude compared to a model with zero transfers. Transfers lower aggregate labor and plant
labor, ni,t. If transfers are large enough, low productivity plants operate at the minimum
scale n¯ sooner than in a model with zero transfers. The profit share at these plants declines
and the economy’s capital share is less than θ, earlier in the transition.
Moreover, the decline in the capital share is of larger magnitude in the economy with
transfers. Recall that the capital share is φ = θ − (θ − φL,t) · YL,t/Yt (see derivation in
Section 5.1). First, the profit share of low productivity plants, φL,t, is lower compared to a
model with zero transfers. When zL-plants operate at n¯, their output is fixed zLn¯1−θ. The
higher wage rate that prevails in an economy with transfers thus leads to lower profits,
piL,t = zLn¯
1−θ − wtn¯, and a lower profit share. Second, the share of output produced by
low productivity plants, YL,t/Yt, is higher compared to the zero transfer model. The zH-
plants decrease their optimal labor input and hence their output in response to the higher
wages. Low productivity plants are constrained to operate at n¯. All else equal, this leads
to a larger share of output being produced by low productivity plants.
Wage markups produce qualitatively similar effects on the capital share. I consider the
calibrated economy from Section 4, but eliminate the transfers. I let wages be perfectly
competitive at time t = 0, ν¯0 = 1, and consider a permanent increase in wage markups,
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ν¯t < 1 for all t ≥ 1. Wage markups lower output growth during the transition compared
to a perfectly competitive economy, as aggregate labor and the accumulation of capital
are depressed. The capital share falls below θ earlier in the transition, and declines by
more in the presence of wage markups, similar to the impact of transfers.
When the two government policies—transfers and wage markups—are considered to-
gether, they have nonlinear effects on the capital income share. To illustrate this result,
I show—using the numerical experiments discussed in this section—that the capital in-
come share is a concave function of the policies. Thus, the joint impact of the two policies
on reducing the capital share is larger than the sum of contributions of each policy.
Figure 6: THE CAPITAL SHARE AS A FUNCTION OF POLICIES
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0.24
0.276
0.33
0.353
0.365
No wage markup
Wage markup = 1.35
A
B
C
NOTES: Notes
Figure 6 plots the capital income share at time period t = 3 of a transition, in a range of
experiments with one-time permanent changes in transfers and markups. The solid line
plots results from an economy with no wage markups (i.e., ν¯t = 1 for all t), as transfers
vary from 0 to 70 percent of output. The dashed line plots the capital income share as
transfers vary when the wage markup is 1/νt = 1.35 for all t ≥ 1. When both markups
and transfers are zero, the aggregate capital income share at t = 3 is 0.365, the calibrated
value of θ. Introducing transfers of 50 percent of GDP, reduces the capital share at t = 3
to 0.353 (point A on Figure 6). Alternatively, keeping transfers at zero, but introducing a
wage markup 1/νt = 1.35 reduces the capital share to 0.33 (point B in the figure). Point C
shows the joint impact of 35 percent wage markups and 50 percent transfers on the capital
share at time t = 3. In particular, with both policies the capital share is 0.276, a decline of
25
8.9 percentage points from the value of θ, nearly double the sum of contributions of the
two policies (which is 4.7 percentage points).
The nonlinear effects observed are driven by asymmetric responses of high and low
productivity plants to increased wages and depressed aggregate labor induced by trans-
fers and markups. High productivity plants lower their labor input and maintain a
profit share of θ. However, low productivity plants operate at the minimum scale, n¯,
and thus have a profit share lower than θ. Since the aggregate capital share is given
by φ = θ − (θ − φL,t) · YL,t/Yt (equation 13), the impact of transfers and markups on φ
depends on the fraction of output produced by low productivity plants and their profit
share. Thus, policies affect the aggregate capital share in a nonlinear fashion.
6 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, I perform sensitivity analysis with respect to the initial capital output ratio,
the minimum scale parameter and the time-varying inputs used in the benchmark model.
The range of estimates for the initial capital stock to output ratio in East Germany is
wide, from 1.6 to 4.9 (see Section 4.1). The benchmark model is calibrated to match an
initial capital output ratio of 3.5. Figure 7 presents the model’s results for output and the
capital income share when the initial capital to output ratio is 2.5, 3.5 or 4.5. In each case,
other model parameters are recalibrated to match the targets described in Table 2. The
predictions for output are similar across these experiments. With an initial capital stock
to output ratio of 2.5, the decline in the capital share is lower than in the benchmark (9.3
percentage points compared to 11), but the recovery is faster and tracks the data closely
for the remaining years.
Figure 8 plots the model’s results for output and the capital income share, when the
ratio of n¯ to N∗/M∗H takes three different values: 0.94, 0.84 and 0.44. In the benchmark, zL-
plants hit the minimum scale in period 3 of the model (i.e., 1991), and they stop operating
in period 20 (i.e., 2008), when the capital share equals θ. Lowering n¯ to 0.84 · N∗/M∗H
also delivers zL-plants that operate at the minimum scale in period 3, but these plants
never shut down, and they exit the economy very slowly as the stock of ML depreciates.
As a result, the recovery in the capital share is more gradual (dotted line in Figure 8.b).
Finally, when n¯ equals 0.44 · N∗/M∗H , zL-plants initially operate above n¯ for longer (5
periods). Afterwards, more of the economy’s labor is hired at high-productivity plants,
so having zL-plants operate at the minimum scale has a smaller impact on the aggregate
capital share compared to the experiments with higher n¯. The prediction that all zL-plants
operate during the transition when the ratio of n¯ to N∗/M∗H is lower (i.e., 0.84 or 0.44)
26
Figure 7: EAST GERMANY: DATA AND BENCHMARK MODEL
SENSITIVITY TO INITIAL CAPITAL
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Legend:
NOTES: East Germany’s GDP per capita is detrended as described in Section 4.1.
is inconsistent with evidence on plant closures in East Germany after unification (see
Bru¨cker (1995) or Kaser (2007)). This motivates the choice of n¯ in the benchmark model.
In the benchmark experiment of Section 4, the wage markups were chosen to match
the wage increases between 1989 − 1991 and then held fixed thereafter (Figure 2). I con-
sider alternate wage markups that are the same for 1989 − 1991, but decrease linearly to
no markup in 2040, (ν¯2040 = 1). The predictions from this experiment are nearly identi-
cal to the benchmark for the period 1989 − 2003. In the benchmark, 2004 is the first year
when some zL-plants remain idle. The main difference in the experiment with declining
markups is a smaller increase in wages during the transition. This leads to a larger in-
crease in hours worked and a higher GDP per capita after year 2004. A higher labor input
means that zL-plants are used in production for a longer time, and they become idle and
exit the economy later. As a result, the capital share in this model is a bit lower following
2004 compared to the benchmark, but in both experiments it equals 0.365 by 2014.
I also perform sensitivity analysis by allowing transfers to linearly decline to zero by
year 2040, as opposed to 2020 in the benchmark. The predictions from this experiment
are almost identical to the benchmark. The main differences occur after 2020, when due
to positive transfers, the labor input is lower.
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Figure 8: EAST GERMANY: DATA AND BENCHMARK MODEL
SENSITIVITY TO n¯
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Legend:
NOTES: East Germany’s GDP per capita is detrended as described in Section 4.1.
7 Conclusions
It is well-documented that the shares of income accruing to capital and labor are fairly
constant in many countries, but show small variations over time. This paper documents a
dramatic departure from the constancy of factor income shares in East Germany following
the 1990 unification with West Germany. The capital share of income in East Germany
plunged to 15.2 percent in 1991, then increased to 37.4 percent by 2015.
To account for this fact, and motivated by the opening up of the East German econ-
omy, I build a dynamic general equilibrium model in which an economy transitions from
a low to high productivity technology embodied in plants. The model’s implied aggre-
gate production function delivers endogenous variations in the capital income share, due
to a non-convexity in the plant level production technology. Two government policies
that set East Germany apart from other transition economies—large transfers from West
Germany and dramatic wage increases—amplify the decline in the capital share early
in the transition. While this paper analyzes East Germany, the finding that technology
change induces variations in the capital share has applicability to other economies.
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A Appendix
A.1 Data Appendix
Data for East Germany cover five states: Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Sach-
sen, Sachsen-Anhalt and Thu¨ringen. East Berlin is excluded due to lack of data. The data
used in this paper are from several sources, as outlined below.
(i) Statistisches A¨mter Der Bundes und Der La¨nder, Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrech-
nungen der La¨nder, henceforth VGRdL (http://www.vgrdl.de),
(ii) The Conference Board, Total Economy Database, May 2016 release, henceforth
TED 2016 and the March 2018 release, henceforth TED 2018 (https://www.conference-
board.org/data/economydatabase/),
(iii) Statistisches Bundesamt, Genesis-Online Datenbank, henceforth Genesis-Online
(https://www-genesis.destatis.de/genesis/online),
(iv) the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, henceforth OECD
(available at http://stats.oecd.org and http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/statistics), and
(v) United Nations, World Population Prospects 2017, henceforth UN
(https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/.
Real gross domestic product (GDP) for East Germany (covering the five aforemen-
tioned states and excluding Berlin) is available from VGRdL since 1991. To obtain real
GDP for years 1989 and 1990, I use the growth rates of East Germany’s GDP reported in
TED 2016 and the level of GDP in 1991 from VGRdL.
The working-age (15 − 64) population for East Germany since 1991 is from Genesis-
Online, Series: 12411 − 0011, Population: La¨nder, reference date, age. Data for 1989 and
1990 is from Table 3.9 of the 1991 and 1992 Statistical Yearbooks of Germany (see Statistis-
ches Jahrbuch fu¨r die Bundesrepublik Deutschland available at https://www.destatis.de).
For comparison with East Germany, I construct GDP per working-age (15− 64) popu-
lation starting 1989 for twelve other transition economies (i.e. Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia and
Ukraine) using GDP data from TED 2018 and working-age population from the UN.
East Germany’s capital income share is computed using equation 1 in Section 2, and
nominal data from VGRdL. Since the labor income of the self-employed in not reported,
I follow an imputation method suggested by Gollin (2002, p. 468) which assumes a self-
employed person earns the average employees’ compensation. I multiply by the stock of
self-employed (from VGRdL or Genesis-Online) to obtain their total labor income.
Net transfers from West to East Germany up to 2003 are from Uhlig (2008, Figure 2).
33
For 2004 − 2015, I compute the growth rates of East Germany’s trade balance deficit to
GDP ratio using VGRdL data, and assume net transfers shrink at the same annual rates.
This proxy for the costs of unification was suggested by IWH (2014).
Total hours worked for East Germany are available from VGRdL since 2000. To com-
pute East German hours for 1991 − 1999, I combine OECD and VGRdL data. Letting H
denote total hours worked, HEast Germany1991−1999 = H
Germany
1991−1999 − HWest Germany1991−1999 − HBerlin1991−1999. I con-
struct hours for Germany and West Germany using VGRdL data on total employed (E)
and OECD data on hours worked by employed persons (H/E), as in equation 14. The
OECD data have longer availability and are interpolated with VGRdL data.28
H ≡ H
E
· E (14)
To construct hours for Berlin, I use data on E from VGRdL, and an estimate of H/E.
Since the OECD doesn’t provide data on hours worked by employed persons for Berlin, I
assume that (H/E)Berlin1991−1999 = 1.05 ·(H/E)Germany1991−1999, where 1.05 represents the average ratio
of these hours in Berlin relative to Germany in VGRdL data over 2000− 2005.
Total hours worked in East Germany in 1989 are computed asHEast Germany1989 =
H
East Germany
1991
0.955·0.735 ,
where the denominator captures estimates from the literature on the changes in H/E and
E over the two year period. Namely, Bird, Schwarze, and Wagner (1994) report a 4.5
percent decline in hours worked by employed persons in East Germany from 1989 to
1991. Dornbusch and Wolf (1994) report a 26.5 percent drop in East German employment
over the two year period. Krueger and Pischke (1995) report a similar number.
East German average hours worked per working-age person are computed as total
hours worked divided by the population of ages 15 to 64, and expressed relative to 5200
hours per year (52 weeks times 100 hours each). For comparison with East Germany, I
construct average hours worked for the transition economies previously mentioned using
total hours worked from the Conference Board’s Total Economy Database and population
from UN. Hours in TED 2016 are available since 1990, while an older release from June
2009 has hours data starting in 1989. Ukraine hours are not available.
East Germany’s hourly wage rates since 1991 are computed as compensation of em-
ployees divided by total hours worked by employees. Total employee hours are the num-
ber of employees times the average hours worked by employed persons (H/E). Nominal
wage rates are deflated using the consumption deflator from national accounts.
Tax rates for Germany are computed using the methodology of Mendoza, Razin, and
Tesar (1994) and data from the OECD Revenue Statistics and National Accounts.
28Hours worked by employed persons (H/E) for Germany from the OECD and VGRdL are identical
over 2000− 2015, while for West Germany OECD data over 2000− 2011 are 1 percent higher, on average.
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A.2 Proofs and Derivations of Equilibrium Conditions
A.2.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The aggregate production function has five branches depending on which plants operate
and how much labor they employ. To simplify the derivations, I drop time subscripts.
Case 1. Suppose all plants operate and are allocated more than the minimum labor
requirement. That is, mi = Mi for i ∈ {L,H}, and ni > n¯ for i ∈ {L,H}.
The aggregate production function is:
F (N,MH ,ML) = max{ni}i∈{H,L}
MHzHn
1−θ
H +MLzLn
1−θ
L
s.t. MHnH +MLnL = N
The first order conditions yield: nH = ρnL, where ρ ≡
(
zH
zL
)1/θ
. The feasibility constraint
then gives nL = NρMH+ML . Next, I use the expressions for nH and nL to obtain:
F (N,MH ,ML) = zLN
1−θ (ρMH +ML)
θ
Recall that I assumed ni > n¯. Thus, nL = NρMH+ML > n¯⇔ N > (ρMH +ML) n¯
To summarize: If N > (ρMH +ML) n¯, then F (N,MH ,ML) = zL (ρMH +ML)
θN1−θ.
Case 2. Suppose all plants operate. Suppose zH-plants are allocated more than the
minimum labor requirement, while zL-plants operate at the minimum scale. That is, mi =
Mi for i ∈ {L,H}, nH > n¯, and nL = n¯.
The aggregate production function is:
F (N,MH ,ML) = max
nH
MHzHn
1−θ
H +MLzLn¯
1−θ
s.t. MHnH +MLn¯ = N
The solution is nH = N−MLn¯MH . The aggregate production function is then given by:
F (N,MH ,ML) = zHM
θ
H (N −MLn¯)1−θ + zLn¯1−θML
The restriction nH > n¯ implies that N > (MH +ML) n¯.
To sum up: If N > (MH +ML) n¯, F (N,MH ,ML) = zHM θH (N −MLn¯)1−θ + zLn¯1−θML.
Case 3. Suppose all zH-plants operate and are allocated at least the minimum labor
requirement. Suppose only some zL-plants operate and they operate at the minimum
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scale. That is, mH = MH , nH ≥ n¯, 0 < mL < ML, and nL = n¯.
The aggregate production function is:
F (N,MH ,ML) = max
nH ,mL
MHzHn
1−θ
H +mLzLn¯
1−θ
s.t. MHnH +mLn¯ = N
The measure of low productivity plants that operate is given by mL = N−MHnHn¯ . Then:
F (N,MH ,ML) = max
nH≥n¯
MHzHn
1−θ
H +
(
N
n¯
− MHnH
n¯
)
zLn¯
1−θ
The first order condition yields nH = αn¯, where α ≡
(
(1−θ)zH
zL
)1/θ
. Combining the first
order condition with nH ≥ n¯ yields nH = max {1, α} n¯. Using the expressions for mL and
nH , the assumption 0 < mL < ML becomes max {1, α}MH n¯ < N < [max {1, α}MH +ML] n¯.
To summarize: If max {1, α}MH n¯ < N < [max {1, α}MH +ML] n¯, then
F (N,MH ,ML) =
[
zLn¯
−θ]N + [zH max {1, α}1−θ − zL max {1, α}] n¯1−θMH
Case 4. Suppose all zH-plants operate and are allocated more than the minimum labor
requirement. Suppose no zL-plants operate. That is, mH = MH , nH > n¯, mL = nL = 0.
The aggregate production function is:
F (N,MH ,ML) = max
nH
MHzHn
1−θ
H
s.t. MHnH = N
The solution is nH = N/MH and F (N,MH ,ML) = zHM θHN
1−θ.
Recall that I assumed nH > n¯. This implies that N/MH > n¯. Moreover, from Case 3, I
know that if max {1, α}MH n¯ < N then mL > 0; hence, I can restrict N ≤ max {1, α}MH n¯.
To summarize: If MH n¯ < N ≤ max {1, α}MH n¯, then F (N,MH ,ML) = zHM θHN1−θ.
Case 5. Suppose only some zH-plants operate, and they hire the minimum amount of
labor. Suppose no zL-plants operate. That is, mH < MH , nH = n¯, mL = nL = 0.
The aggregate production function is:
F (N,MH ,ML) = max
mH
mHzH n¯
1−θ
s.t. mH n¯ = N
The solution is mH = N/n¯ and F (N,MH ,ML) = zH n¯−θN .
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Recall I assumed mH < MH . This implies N/n¯ < MH .
To summarize: If N < MH n¯, then F (N,MH ,ML) = zH n¯−θN.
So far, I have shown that:
F (N,MH ,ML) = (15)
f1 ≡ zL (ρMH +ML)θN1−θ if N > (ρMH +ML) n¯
f2 ≡ zHM θH (N −MLn¯)1−θ + zLn¯1−θML if N > (MH +ML) n¯
f3 ≡ AMH + zLn¯−θN if GαMH n¯ ≤ N < (GαMH +ML) n¯
f4 ≡ zHM θHN1−θ if MH n¯ ≤ N ≤ GαMH n¯
f5 ≡ zH n¯−θN if N ≤MH n¯
where Gα ≡ max {1, α} and A =
[
zH (Gα)
1−θ − zLGα
]
n¯1−θ.
Next, it is easy to show that the following statements hold:
f1 = f2 if N = (ρMH +ML) n¯ (16)
f1 > f2 if N > (ρMH +ML) n¯
f3 = f2 if N = (GαMH +ML) n¯
f3 > f2 if N ∈ ((MH +ML) n¯, (αMH +ML) n¯) where α > 1
Combining (15) and (16), I find the production function in Proposition (1).
A.2.2 Equilibrium Decision Rules for Plant Labor
Corollary 7 The derivation of the aggregate production function in Section A.2.1 shows that the
decision rules for plant labor are given by:
nH,t =

ρNt
ρMH,t+ML,t
if Nt ≥ η1,t
Nt−ML,tn¯
MH,t
if Nt ∈ [η2,t, η1,t]
max {1, α} n¯ if Nt ∈ [η3,t, η2,t]
Nt/MH,t if Nt ∈ [η4,t, η3,t]
n¯ if Nt ≤ η4,t
nL =

Nt
ρMH,t+ML,t
if Nt ≥ η1,t
n¯ if Nt ∈ [η2,t, η1,t]
n¯ if Nt ∈ [η3,t, η2,t]
0 if Nt ∈ [η4,t, η3,t]
0 if Nt ≤ η4,t
where η1 ≡ (ρMH,t +ML,t) n¯, η2 ≡ (GαMH,t +ML,t) n¯, η3 ≡ GαMH,tn¯, η4 ≡ MH,tn¯ and
where Gα ≡ max {1, α} .
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A.2.3 Proof of Proposition 2
During the transition the stock of zL-plants depreciates over time while the more pro-
ductive zH-plants accumulate. I derive the limit of the aggregate production function as
ML,t → 0.
Using equation (4), limML,t→0 η1,t = ρMH,tn¯ and limML,t→0 η2,t = GαMH,tn¯ = η3,t, the
aggregate production function as ML,t → 0 can be written as:
lim
ML,t→0
F (Nt,MH,t,ML,t) =

zLρ
θM θH,tN
1−θ
t if Nt ≥ ρMH,tn¯
zHM
θ
H,tN
1−θ
t if GαMH,tn¯ ≤ Nt ≤ ρMH,tn¯
AMH,t + zLn¯
−θNt if GαMH,tn¯ = Nt = GαMH,tn¯
zHM
θ
H,tN
1−θ
t if MH,tn¯ ≤ Nt ≤ GαMH,tn¯
zH n¯
−θNt if Nt ≤MH,tn¯
(17)
where Gα ≡ max {1, α} and A =
[
zH (Gα)
1−θ − zLGα
]
n¯1−θ.
Notice that asML → 0 the third branch of the production function essentially collapses
to one point. At Nt = GαMH,tn¯ the output is:
AMH,t + zLn¯
−θNt =
[
zH (Gα)
1−θ − zLGα
]
n¯1−θMH,t + zLn¯−θ (GαMH,tn¯)
= zH (Gα)
1−θ n¯1−θMH,t = zHMH,t
(
Nt
MH,t
)1−θ
= zHM
θ
H,tN
1−θ
t
Moreover, using ρ ≡
(
zH
zL
)1/θ
, i.e. zH = zLρθ, the output on the first branch of the
production function can also be written as: zHM θH,tN
1−θ
t .
To summarize, equation (17), becomes:
lim
ML,t→0
F (Nt,MH,t,ML,t) =
{
zHM
θ
H,tN
1−θ
t if Nt ≥MH,tn¯
zH n¯
−θNt if Nt ≤MH,tn¯
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A.2.4 Intertemporal and Intratemporal Equilibrium Conditions
I derive the first order conditions of the jth union’s problem presented in Section 3.2. For
the time being, I ignore the requirement that the markup be at most 1/ν¯t. Let λt (j) denote
the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint at time t. The first order conditions are
summarized by the budget constraints, the laws of motion for capital, XL,t (j) = 0, and:
βtUC [Ct (j) , lt (j)] = λt (j) · (1 + τC,t)
βtUl [Ct (j) , lt (j)]
∂lt (j)
∂wt (j)
= −λt (j) · (1− τN,t)
[
lt (j) + wt (j)
∂lt (j)
∂wt (j)
]
(18)
λt (j)
λt+1 (j)
= (1 + (1− τM,t+1) (rH,t+1 − δH))
and the transversality condition: limt→∞ βtUC [Ct (j) , lt (j)]MH,t+1 (j) = 0.
The Euler Equation is:
UC (Ct (j) , lt (j))
UC (Ct+1 (j) , lt+1 (j))
= β
1 + τC,t
1 + τC,t+1
(1 + (1− τM,t+1) (rH,t+1 − δH))
To simplify equation (18), I derive ∂lt (j) /∂wt (j) . Recall that the demand for labor of
type j is given by equation (6), i.e. lt (j) =
(
wt
wt(j)
)1/(1−ν)
Nt. Thus,
∂lt (j)
∂wt (j)
= w
1/(1−ν)
t Nt
1
ν − 1wt (j)
1/(ν−1)−1 =
1
ν − 1
lt (j)
wt (j)
Then, equation (18) becomes:
βtUl [Ct (j) , lt (j)]
1
ν − 1
lt (j)
wt (j)
= −λt (1− τN,t) ν
ν − 1 lt (j)
⇔ βtUl [Ct (j) , lt (j)] = −λt (1− τN,t) νwt (j)
The intratemporal condition can be written as:
wt (j) = −1
ν
(1 + τC,t)
(1− τN,t)
Ul [Ct (j) , lt (j)]
UC [Ct (j) , lt (j)]
(19)
where 1/ν is the markup that the union chooses. If the government requires that the
markup be at most 1/ν¯t, I obtain equation (12) from the paper.
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